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Abstract 
In this study we perform an analysis of the volatility of the budget deficit for EU countries. We 
address this issue starting from the new requirements of fiscal discipline imposed by the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance adopted by 25 European Union member states and 
taking into account the economic crisis impact. The major purpose of this study is to identify the 
most significant determinants of budget deficit volatility in a comparative study for old EU 
member states and New Member States (NMS). This study aims to test the impact of 
macroeconomic variables such as public expenditures, economic growth rate, and 
unemployment on the budget balance volatility, based on panel data. 
The final purpose of the article is to reveal the strategies to stop the immense increase in fiscal 
deficits and to regain fiscal stability to fulfil the new rules of fiscal governance. We anticipate 
that the implementation of this new fiscal discipline requires a more efficient public sector for 
both old and NMS and a reconsideration of state intervention in the economy. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effects of economic, political and fiscal variables on the budget balance 
volatility. We begin this analysis with a review of the major empirical and theoretical papers in 
this area, that explain the methodology used for this study, and also a short descriptive analysis 
of data. 
Moreover, the paper highlights the most important determinants of the budget deficit for the EU 
countries based on asymmetric analysis between the old and new member states. Based on the 
empirical findings we try to underline some new trends for the fiscal policy promoted by the EU 
member states for reducing the level of public debt on the long run and implicitly assuring a 
better stability for the public finances in the EU. 
The new fiscal discipline imposed by this “fiscal compact” is based on stricter surveillance 
within the euro area, in particular by establishing a "balanced budget rule". We develop this 
comparative study because we consider relevant the asymmetric conditions for these two groups 
of countries concerning fiscal policy. The EU new member states are countries with some 
particularities in their political, institutional and economic context. Our methodology is based on 
a descriptive analysis of the evolution of the budget deficit and also on and econometric analysis 
of correlation between budget deficit volatility and other macroeconomic variables like public 
expenditures, economic growth rate, unemployment, population, and inflation. The study used 
annual data starting with 1996-2011 based on panel data techniques. 
The global financial crisis brought to the forefront the issue of the fiscal deficit and public debt 
which continued to growing fast in the last five years. This is the result of the fiscal policies 
promoted by the governments, but also the result of macroeconomic, political and social 
circumstances. 
In this regard, Cornia & Nelson (2010) mention two main factors which can affect the growth 
and volatility of state tax revenue receipts over the business cycle. First, the uniqueness of each 
state’s economy ultimately affects its growth and volatility. Second, a state’s choice of taxes, tax 
base, and tax rates can alter the revenue growth and volatility inherent in its economy.  
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The issue of reducing the fiscal balance deficit and fulfil the requirements imposed by the EU – 
maximum 3% of GDP (Stability and Growth Pact) for the budget deficit and more recently 
(through Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance - Fiscal Compact) for the annual 
structural government deficit 0.5% of GDP – becomes an important challenge for all EU 
members states nowadays. The global financial crisis not only changed the economic and 
political framework and imposed new fiscal policy measures, but also a new trend for the fiscal 
policy of the EU member states. Based on these new conditions the member states try to reduce 
the budget deficit increasing VAT rates and decreasing public expenditure. The huge budget 
deficits cannot be accepted as a solid ground of economic growth because of the level of public 
debt, which tends to be an equation without solution for many countries like Greece, Italy, 
Ireland or Portugal, where the public debt level is more than 100% of GDP.  
Considering the requirement of structural government deficits we consider as a possible solution 
for reducing the public debt or at least maintaining a stable level on the long run – reducing the 
budget deficit volatility. Some countries try to have a budget surplus for improving the public 
finance stability, for instance in 2011 – Hungary + 4.3% of GDP, Estonia + 1% of GDP and 
Sweden +0.3% of GDP, but obviously on the long run the budget surplus is hard to be 
maintained. A high variation between deficit and surplus of the budget means instability of 
revenues and unpredicted sources of financing for public expenditures. Based on this, reducing 
the budget deficit volatility it is a proper solution for assuring the public finance stability in the 
long run. Breunig and Koski (2011), explain why is so important a lower budget volatility from 
needs-based perspective, and underline the impact of huge budget volatility on the public 
expenditures altering the public service financing. The same author defines the budget volatility 
as variation of budget expenditures over time, but we consider not only the expenditure side, but 
also the revenue side for computing the volatility. 
 
In this paper we try to isolate what are the major factors that contribute to the volatility of budget 
deficits increases for the EU countries. Our analysis consider an asymmetric behaviour between 
the 12 new member states (NMS12)3 and the old member states (EU15) based on the different 
                                                          
3
 The countries are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Malta, and Cyprus. 
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degree of development - a higher GDP per capita in the old member states, a higher economic 
growth rate in the NMS12, and also with different trends of fiscal policy between this two groups 
of countries. This study tries to test this asymmetry concerning the determinants of budget deficit 
and fiscal policy between the old member states and the new EU members. 
Even if many NMS12 countries have a lower public debt (below 60%) budget deficit volatility 
represents an important cause of public finances’ instability and for this reason also these 
countries should act for counteracting this volatility in the long run. If this budget volatility is the 
result of a boost of economic growth is not seen as a danger, but if it is a consequence of a 
recession becomes a major issue for the governments. The major characteristics of their fiscal 
policy are a lower tax burden with proportional income taxation and also a lower level of public 
expenditures.  
On the other hand, the old member states have a higher tax burden with progressive income 
taxation, a high degree of spending because the welfare state is more developed and also public 
indebtedness is higher. In this context the budget balance evolution is quite different between 
these two groups of countries. The major concern of all EU countries remains the public debt and 
finding solutions for reducing it, and a good start point is reducing the budget balance volatility 
in the long run. This means stable revenues and expenditures for the government, but how can 
that be accomplished after five years since the beginning the global financial crisis? Definitely 
we are referring to a few solutions not just one, and these have to be different between the EU 
countries. The huge disparities concerning the level of public debt require specific solutions, but 
all these solutions have the same ground in the end – increasing the efficiency of the public 
sector. The welfare state has to become more efficient and act like a private welfare state based 
on efficiency and productivity. In this context our analysis proceeds to identify the 
macroeconomic determinants of budget volatility and the measure in which they can be changed 
for reducing this volatility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a short synthesis of previously 
empirical and theoretical research realized in this area until now. In Section 3 are discussed and 
explained methodological aspects and descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the main 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes notably with economic and political implications. 
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2. Literature review 
Following the previous studies on this subject, we can synthesize a few research directions, for 
instance: 
- studies focused on the causes and determinants of the public deficits and excessive 
deficits - Roubini & Sachs (1989), Bayar (2001), Bayar & Smeets (2009), Castro, 
(2007); 
- studies on the volatility of public expenditures and public revenues and the impact of this 
volatility on economic growth - Afonso & Furceri (2010), Afonso & Jalles (2012); 
- and, finally, a smaller literature on the determinants of the budget balance volatility -
Agnello & Sousa (2009). 
Our start point of this paper is the study by Agnello & Sousa (2009) concerning the most 
important determinants of public deficit for 125 countries, including also the EU15 countries. In 
the light of that previous study we try to reflect on the determinants of budget balance volatility 
in a comparative view between old and NMS. In the study mentioned before it is provided with 
an empirical research of the political, institutional and economic determinants of public budget 
volatility, using a GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models, based on annual data 
from 1980 until 2006. Their major findings are focused on political and institutional factors. In 
this regard, the higher level of political instability can lead to an increase of budget volatility. 
Also they test their results for EU15 using a dummy variable, but without an evidence of 
systematic differences of deficit volatility for countries belonging to Euro-15 region and other 
countries. Another important contribution of the paper is a sensitivity analysis taking into 
account a level of 3% of GDP for budget deficit and 50% for inflation; higher levels of these 
indicators conduct to a higher volatility. 
Our study underlines the impact of fiscal and economic determinants, more important for the 
budget volatility in the actual context affected by the economic crisis. 
A more disaggregated analysis of the impact of budgetary volatility is done by Afonso & Furceri 
(2010), even if it is an indirect analysis because is considering the impact of volatility of public 
revenues and expenditures on economic growth for OECD and EU countries from 1970 to 2004. 
Their analysis is based on the components of the expenditures and revenues and the major 
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findings reflect the negative and significant impact on economic growth, due to the size and 
volatility of indirect taxes, social contributions, subsidies and government consumption.  
Because the budget volatility is not the subject of many papers, we also consider some papers 
which focus on the causes or determinants of budget deficit. In this light, Bayar & Smeets (2009) 
for EU 15 identify the major factors which can have an impact on the changes of budget deficit. 
The study is based on a few determinants: change of GDP growth rate, change of unemployment 
rate, change of real debt-cost service, political and institutional variables, but a greater attention 
is on the political and institutional factors.  
The political and economic determinants of the budget deficit are also analyzed by Roubini & 
Sachs (1989). Their paper presents the development of the budget deficit for OECD countries 
starting with 1960 until 1985, underlining the huge increases after 1979 due to the increase of 
interest rates. 
The excessive budget deficits determinants are analyzed by Castro (2007) using a binary choice 
model with a dependent dummy variable the deficit level of 3% of GDP, for EU 15 since 1970 
until 2006. The paper results show that a weak fiscal stance, low economic growth, the timing of 
parliamentary elections and majority left-wing governments are the main causes of excessive 
deficits in the EU countries.  
Tujula & Wolswijk (2004) perform an empirical investigation for identifying the determinants of 
budget balance for OECD and EU countries, considering in this case changes in government debt 
in previously year, real GDP growth (with a positive impact), interest rate, election year and 
inflation. Their findings reveal that higher interest rates affect budget deficits negatively and 
election years are also clearly reflected in larger budget deficits.  
 
3. Methodology and descriptive statistics 
The issue of reducing the public debt becomes more acute for many old EU member states with 
more than 100% of GDP debt ratios and requires complex measures from a political, economic 
and social perspective. We start our analysis considering the correlation between the budget 
deficit and public debt for EU countries in 2011, displayed in Figure 1. From the simple 
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regression equation it can be seen the direct correlation between budget deficit and public debt, 
with countries with higher budget deficits having, as it is natural, higher levels of public debt.  
Indeed, the highest levels of public debt are accompanied by the highest deficits. For instance, 
the budget deficit of Greece is almost 10% of GDP and the consequence - highest level of public 
debt. Similar case we can find in Ireland, Italy and UK.  If Hungary is not considered (with a 
budgetary surplus), the correlation is more powerful, with almost 33% of countries with higher 
deficit having higher levels of public debt. This stylised evidence is in favour of reducing the 
budget deficit volatility for accomplishing a lower level of public debt.  
Figure 1 Correlation between public debt and budget deficit in EU countries in 2011 
y = -4,6203x + 47,485
R² = 0,2121
0,0
50,0
100,0
150,0
200,0
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Source: own computation based on Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 2 reflects a comparative evolution of budget deficits as an average for the EU27, EU15 
and NMS12. Until 2005 in the new member states the budget deficit is higher than 3% of GDP, 
but after that year a considerable improvement can be observed until the beginning of economic 
crisis. For the EU15 the average budget balance obeys the ceiling of 3% of GDP, except in 2004 
and the years marked by the global financial crisis.  
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Figure 2. Budget balance evolution 
 
Source: based on Eurostat data. 
 
In the empirical analysis we are using a few categories of determinants of budget deficit 
volatility:  macroeconomic determinants, fiscal variables, political variable and as a control 
variable population.  
As a dependent variable we choose the budget deficit volatility computed as standard deviation 
(rolling window) for 4 years and 3 years, to take into account some features of the business 
cycle. Considering the fiscal variables included in the model also we compute the volatility of 
public revenue and expenditures for 4 years and 3 years.  
Unlike, the previously studies, which were focused more on the political and institutional 
variables, this study is oriented more towards the relevance of economic and fiscal variables for 
explaining the budget deficit volatility. We consider these aspects because we want to reveal 
how it is feasible to reduce the budget deficit volatility if the economic conditions are changing 
and the government promotes a fiscal policy more oriented to reducing public debt – and issue 
faced by almost all EU member states in the present context.  
In order to test the impact of the main determinants of the budget deficit volatility we use for 
panel ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations (following Wooldridge, 2002:288). Starting from 
the equations used by Agnello & Sousa (2009), Afonso et al. (2010, 2012) we specify the 
baseline equation: 
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BVit=α0+ α1*Xit+ α2*Yit+ α3Zit+ α4Wit+εit .                     (1) 
 
In this baseline equation we introduce as the dependent variable the standard deviation of the 
budget deficit. As regressors we use a few categories of variables: Xit represents macroeconomic 
variables such as the change of economic growth rate, GDP per capita, investment, inflation and 
unemployment rate; Yit are fiscal variables: expenditures, revenues, budget deficit, public debt, 
expenditure volatility, revenue volatility; political variable (Polity 2), is noted with Zit and as a 
control variable we choose the population Wit (see Appendix 1 for data description).  
 
For the beginning we estimate a model with neither fixed nor random effects. Than we use fixed 
and random effects according with the result of Hausman test. Our estimates are for all EU 27 
countries, but also we choose to divide the EU countries in two groups: the EU 15 – old member 
states and the NMS12 - new member states. To test the robustness of the results we also use for 
the EU 15 a dummy variable. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to test the budget volatility 
determinants taking into account the conditions imposed by the Maastricht Treaty concerning the 
level of budget deficit of 3%, and 60% for public debt. In this regard we introduce this limit as a 
dummy variable to reflect how difficult is for the country which not accomplish this limits to 
reduce the budget volatility.  
Tables A2.2. and A2.3. (Appendix 2) report descriptive statistics for the data set used in the 
econometric methodology for all EU 27, separately for the EU15 and for the NMS12. 
Concerning the level of budget deficit on average in NMS12 is higher (3.54% of GDP) than in 
EU15 (2.23% of GDP), but the standard deviation computed between countries is lower in 
NMS12, fact due to a more homogeneity of the fiscal policy conducted by these countries. In 
EU15 standard deviation is 4.08 percentage points as a result of the fiscal policy of 
Mediterranean states with the highest level of budget deficit. Concerning the average budget 
volatility for the both the EU15 and the NMS12 we have similar data, but we expect a different 
significance for determinants.  
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4. Empirical findings  
Starting from the baseline equation we make the estimations considering the three categories of 
fiscal variables: revenues variable (results are in Table 1, 2 and 3), expenditures variables (results 
in Table 4 and 5), deficit and debt variable (results in 6 and 7). We choose to separate the fiscal 
regressors in distinctive equations to avoid multicollinearity issues due to the fact that spending 
and revenues tend to evolve together. 
   
For the 4-year budget deficit volatility for all EU27 member states the most significant 
determinant is GDP change (see Table 1), because can reduce the budget deficit volatility. In 
particular, a percentage point increase of GDP would decrease the budget balance volatility by 
0.11 percentage points for the EU 15 and 0.10 percentage points for the NMS12.  
 
Table 1 – Insert here 
 
GDP per capita is not significant for NMS12, only for EU27 and EU15 and if GDP per capita 
increases this also brings along higher budget deficit volatility. Increasing investment can be a 
solution for reducing the deficit volatility, but without a significant impact in NMS12. The 
unemployment rate increase can lead to higher deficit volatility, and this fact is quite relevant 
because of the powerful impact on both sides of the budget. If the unemployment rate increases 
the tax receipts decrease because less income taxes and social contributions are paid and, at the 
same time, public expenditures increase because the Government has to pay more unemployment 
benefits.  
In the case of inflation, the results are significant for EU 15 and increasing the inflation seems to 
reduce the budget volatility. The control variable - population has a negative and significant 
impact on budget volatility. The political variables are not significant for the EU countries. For 
the NMS12 revenues are not significant for budget balance volatility, only the revenue volatility, 
a fact due to the lower level of tax receipts, instead, for the EU15 the revenue and their volatility 
is quite significant. If fiscal revenues are increasing than the volatility is reduced, but revenue 
volatility induces a higher volatility for the budget balance. 
 
Table 1a – Insert here 
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Table 1a reveals the same estimation like Table 1 based on fixed and random effects. We use 
Hausmann test for deciding between fixed or random effects. When the value of Hausman test is 
very high (p >0.05) we choose to use for estimation random effects, even if according to Clark 
and Linzer (2012) however, it does not necessarily follow that the random effects estimator is 
“safely" free from bias, and therefore to be preferred over the fixed effects estimator. In most 
applications, the true correlation between the covariates and unit effects is not exactly zero.  
The results concerning the significance are not very different from the previously, only small 
difference of estimators. 
For testing the robustness of these results we choose to introduce a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one for the EU15 countries and zero for new member states NMS12.  
 
Table 2 shows the results with the dummy variable for the EU 15 confirming the previous 
results. The 4-year revenue volatility is not significant for EU 15, instead the expenditure 
volatility is significant and with a direct impact on budget volatility. If we introduce in the model 
from Table 2 as regressor the expenditures variables (see equation 2) the R-squared is increasing 
at 73% and this fact reveals the powerful impact of expenditures side on the budget volatility. 
This means that the old members’ states have to maintain a stable level of their public 
expenditures to accomplish public finance stability. But the level of public expenditures is 
expected to increase especially for social protection expenditure and health as long as the ageing 
population impact can’t be diminished. If the expenditures volatility increases by one percentage 
point, then one expects an increase of 0.31 percentage points for the EU15 for the overall budget 
balance volatility. 
 
Table 2 – Insert here 
 
 
The Wald test for equation (3) in Table 2 tests the null hypothesis, which is rejected, that the 
coefficients of revenue volatility and expenditure volatility for EU15 are not significantly 
different. Therefore, the volatility in the case of budget balance comes more from the 
expenditures side, and the volatility of spending contributes more to the budget volatility than 
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revenues volatility. The impact of expenditure volatility is higher than revenue volatility and also 
more significant for all EU countries and this result is in accordance with Afonso & Jalles 
(2012). 
In Table 3 we present the results for the budget balance volatility computed for a rolling window 
of 3-years, for robustness. The results are quite similar with the previously computed 4-years 
volatility measure, and the impact of revenue volatility is higher in the EU15. 
 
Table 3 –Insert here 
 
 
If we consider the expenditures variables, in Table 4, it can be observed the direct impact of 
expenditure volatility on the budget volatility, more powerful in the EU15 comparatively with 
the NMS12, a result confirmed also by the use of the dummy variable. In this case for the 
NMS12 countries investment increases can conduct to a lower volatility for the budget. In this 
case the change of GDP remains significant only for the EU27 and NMS12; and for the EU15 it 
becomes more significant the level of GDP per capita. This result is justified because the new 
member states have a higher economic growth rate and a reduced level of GDP per capita when 
compared with the old member states. 
 
Table 4 –Insert here 
 
If we test the determinants for the 3-years volatility (see Table 5) for the new member states, 
only the change in GDP and expenditure volatility remains significant. Based on this result we 
can identify as solutions for reducing the budget balance volatility on the short run, for new 
member states, the increase of economic growth rate and the reduction of expenditure volatility. 
The same solution can be relevant for the EU15, and in addition also reducing the unemployment 
rate, which is very significant for this group of countries. 
 
Table 5 - Insert here 
 
 
We expected to have a significant impact of revenue and expenditure on the budget volatility, but 
also it is important to see if the impact of the budget deficit and public debt is important. In this 
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context also we choose to test the conditions imposed by Maastricht Treaty for the budget deficit 
level of 3% of GDP and for public debt 60% of GDP. For testing the impact of budget deficit and 
public debt under these conditions we choose to use a dummy variable with the value 1 for the 
countries which do not accomplish the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. The results in 
Table 6 show the significant impact of the budget deficit level for EU27 and EU15 and also for 
those countries which have a deficit higher than 3% of GDP. For the new member states the level 
of budget deficit is not significant for the budget volatility. 
 
Table 6 – Insert here 
 
Concerning the public debt for all EU countries the impact is significant; for the NMS12 an 
increase of public debt leads to higher budget volatility, but in the old new member states an 
increase of public debt can conduct to a decrease in volatility. 
 
Table 7 – Insert here 
 
 
For the budget balance volatility for 3 years the budget deficit and public debt remains 
significant for EU27. For new member states increasing the level of public debt would lead to an 
increase of budget volatility. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper tries to provide new empirical evidence on the budget volatility determinants in a 
comparative view between old and new member states. 
Based on the results obtained from the empirical analysis we can underline the major impact of 
macroeconomic and fiscal variables on the budget balance volatility for EU countries starting 
with 1995. In this context, economic growth rate seems to be the most significant determinant of 
budget balance volatility, and if the economic growth rate increases the budget volatility can be 
reduced. Therefore, the EU member states with higher real GDP growth rates have to use fiscal 
policy for increasing the revenues and this is the case of new member states. For the old member 
states it is recommended to use fiscal policy for reducing the expenditure volatility, thus a stable 
14 
 
budget balance can be accomplished in the long run. For some countries, increasing budget 
revenues is a target quite difficult to accomplish because of the level of the underground 
economy with a significant share in the GDP, for instance in countries like Greece, Italy, 
Romania.  
The unemployment rate impact on the budget volatility is significant and reducing the 
unemployment rate can be a solution for the budget balance stability. The results underline the 
necessity for the old members’ states to maintain a stable level of their public expenditures to 
reach public finances stability. But the level of public expenditures is expected to increase 
especially for social protection expenditure and health, as long as the ageing population impact 
can’t be diminished. Based on these results we can identify as solutions for reducing the budget 
balance volatility on the short run for new member states, mostly the increase in economic 
growth rate and the reduction of government spending volatility.  
For the EU countries the aim is not to have lower budget volatility, and the target has to be 
reducing the level of public debt using as a mean a more stable budget balance, which means 
stable revenues and efficient public spending. If these two conditions are accomplished, than the 
effect will be lower budget volatility and derived from here a decreasing of budget deficit and 
more possibilities for reducing the level of public debt.  
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Appendix 1 - Data description 
Variable  Description Unit Acronym Source 
Gross domestic 
product, constant 
prices 
Annual percentages of constant price 
GDP are year-on-year changes  
Percent 
change 
dGDP 
IMF - WEO 
GDP per capita Gross domestic product based on 
purchasing-power- parity (PPP) per 
capita GDP  
Current 
international 
dollar GDPc 
IMF - WEO 
Total investment Expressed as a ratio of total investment 
in current local currency and GDP in 
current local currency. Investment or 
gross capital formation is measured by 
the total value of the gross fixed 
capital formation and changes in 
inventories and acquisitions less 
disposals of valuables for a unit or 
sector. 
Percent of 
GDP 
I 
IMF - WEO 
Inflation, average 
consumer prices  
Expressed in averages for the year, not 
end-of-period data. A consumer price 
index (CPI) measures changes in the 
prices of goods and services that 
households consume 
Index 
IP 
IMF - WEO 
Unemployment 
rate  
The OECD harmonized unemployment 
rate gives the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the labour 
force (the total number of people 
employed plus unemployed).  
Percent of 
total labour 
force 
Ur 
IMF - WEO 
Population  
 
For census purposes, the total 
population of the country consists of 
all persons falling within the scope of 
the census. 
Millions 
Persons 
P 
IMF - WEO 
General 
government 
revenue  
 
Revenue consists of taxes, social 
contributions, grants receivable, and 
other revenue. 
Percent of 
GDP 
R 
Eurostat 
General 
government total 
expenditure 
Total expenditure consists of total 
expense and the net acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets.  
Percent of 
GDP 
E 
Eurostat 
The government 
deficit/surplus  
Is the net borrowing/net lending of 
general government as defined in the 
ESA95. It is the difference between the 
revenue and the expenditure of the 
general government sector. The 
working balance is the most often used 
concept and measure of the country's 
Percent of 
GDP 
BD 
Eurostat 
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budget deficit/surplus as it generally 
appears in public accounts and 
budgetary presentations. In other 
words, for example, for central 
government it should normally 
correspond to the budgetary outcome 
voted by the parliament. 
Government 
consolidated 
gross debt 
The Maastricht definition of debt is 
total gross debt at nominal value 
outstanding at the end of the year and 
consolidated between and within the 
sectors of general government. 
Percent of 
GDP 
Db 
Eurostat 
POLITY2 This variable is a modified version of 
the POLITY variable added 
in order to facilitate the use of the 
POLITY regime measure in time-
series analyses. It modifies the 
combined annual POLITY score by 
applying a simple treatment, or “fix,” 
to convert instances of 
“standardized authority scores” to 
conventional polity scores.  
The POLITY score is computed by 
subtracting the AUTOC score from the 
DEMOC score; the resulting unified 
polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly 
democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic). 
Index 
Pol 
Polity IV 
database 
Budget volatility 
4-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 4-
years (rolling windows) 
  
BV4 
 
Budget volatility 
3-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 3-
years (rolling windows) 
  
BV3 
 
Revenue 
volatility 4-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 4-
years (rolling windows) 
  
VR4 
 
Revenue 
volatility 3-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 3-
years (rolling windows) 
  
VR3 
 
Expenditure 
volatility 4-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 4-
years (rolling windows) 
  
VE4 
 
Expenditure 
volatility 3-years 
 Computed as standard deviation for 3-
years (rolling windows) 
  
VE3 
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Appendix 2  
Table A2.1– Matrix correlation 
 
Table A2.2. Descriptive statistics for EU27 
EU27 OBSERV.  MEAN ST. DEV.  MIN MAX 
dGDP 451 2,81 3,59 -17,73 11,74 
GDPc 450 23965,16 12225,85 5179,35 82363,63 
I 459 22,28 4,69 8,3 39,96 
IP 453 7,34 50,87 -1,68 1061,21 
Ur 455 8,56 3,98 2,3 22,9 
P 455 18,17 22,4 0,37 82,52 
R 459 42,08 6,62 29,6 57,81 
E 459 44,9 6,61 30,29 65,64 
BD 459 -2,82 3,74 -31,31 6,94 
Db 453 39,3 33,71 -86,78 160,81 
Pol 459 9,61 0,79 5 10,12 
BV4 378 1,8 1,38 0,19 13,41 
BV3 405 1,57 1,4 0,04 12,35 
LogBV3 405 0,05 0,37 -1,45 1,09 
LogBV4 378 0,15 0,3 -0,73 1,13 
VR4 378 1,02 0,68 0,12 3,82 
VR3 405 0,89 0,67 0,06 4,05 
VE4 378 1,77 1,37 0,16 12,69 
VE3 405 1,58 1,44 0,06 12,18 
D 459 0,56 0,5 0 1 
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Table A2.3. Descriptive statistics in UE 15 and NMS12 
VARIABLE  MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX 
EU15 NMS12 EU15 NMS12 EU15 NMS12 EU15 NMS12 
dGDP 2,3 3,48 2,71 4,4 -8,35 -17,73 10,92 11,74 
GDPc 30673,3 15192,98 11370,35 6338,43 13988,15 5179,35 82363,63 29595,39 
OG 0,15 - 2,4  -7,15 - 8,69 - 
I 20,83 24,09 3,15 5,59 10,51 8,3 30,98 39,96 
IP 2,21 13,95 1,23 76,54 -1,68 -1,22 8,91 1061,21 
Ur 7,76 9,58 3,54 4,27 2,3 2,6 22,9 20,51 
P 25,53 8,79 26,12 10,78 0,41 0,37 82,52 38,65 
R 45,23 38,15 6,54 4,19 32,09 29,6 57,81 52,9 
E 47,46 41,7 6,49 5,24 30,29 32,9 65,64 55,8 
BD -2,23 -3,54 4,08 3,12 -31,31 -12,8 6,94 4,2 
Db 42,06 35,88 40,65 21,88 -86,78 3,7 160,81 108,3 
Pol 9,89 9,25 0,37 1 8 5 10,12 10 
BV4 1,8 1,8 1,52 1,18 0,19 0,26 13,41 5,9 
BV3 1,54 1,6 1,5 1,28 0,04 0,06 12,35 6,44 
LogBV3 0,04 0,06 0,37 0,38 -1,45 -1,24 1,09 0,81 
LogBV4 0,15 0,16 0,3 0,3 -0,73 -0,58 1,13 0,77 
VR4 0,8 1,3 0,46 0,8 0,12 0,15 3,09 3,82 
VR3 0,69 1,13 0,43 0,81 0,06 0,1 3,15 4,05 
VE4 1,61 1,97 1,41 1,29 0,16 0,21 12,69 6,74 
VE3 1,39 1,81 1,4 1,45 0,08 0,06 12,18 8,26 
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Table 1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 4-YEARS 
 
ESTIMATION PANEL LEAST SQUARES 
Sample  EU27 EU15 NMS12 
Specifications (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 
 
-3.04 
(-1.39) 
-2.38 
(-1.09) 
-2.47 
(-0.56) 
-0.37 
(0.08) 
-0.16 
(-0.05) 
0.31 
(0.10) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.09*** 
(-5.08) 
 -0.089*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.111*** 
(-3.41) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.05) 
-0.107*** 
(-5.4) 
-0.10*** 
(-5.2) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.764*** 
(4.108) 
0.73*** 
(3.95) 
0.95*** 
(3.19) 
0.71*** 
(2.49) 
0.18 
(0.63) 
0.19 
(0.65) 
 I 
 
-0.06*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.14*** 
(-5.43) 
-0.14*** 
(-5.57) 
-0.012 
(-0.76) 
-0.018 
(-1.11) 
 IP 
 
-0.016 
(-1.26) 
-0.01 
(-1.22) 
-0.259*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.32*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.01 
(-1.39) 
-0.017 
(-1.38) 
Ur 
 
 0.10*** 
(5.19) 
 0.10*** 
(5.45) 
0.17*** 
(5.52) 
0.14*** 
(5.28) 
0.045** 
(2.05) 
0.048** 
(2.16) 
P 
 
-0.012*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.013*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.02*** 
(-6.24) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.98) 
-0.01* 
(-1.69) 
-0.013* 
(-1.77) 
R 
 
-0.03*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.06*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.67) 
0.009 
(0.47) 
0.011 
(0.58) 
VR4 0.42*** 
(4.40) 
 0.16 
(0.86) 
 0.37*** 
(3.62) 
 
  
VR3 
 0.35*** 
(3.70) 
 0.53*** 
2.83 
 0.33*** 
(3.47) 
 Pol 
 
 -0.089 
(-0.82) 
 -0.11 
(-1.03) 
0.05 
(0.279) 
0.062 
(0.31) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
-0.07 
(-0.62) 
Observations 372 372 195 210 162 162 
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.57 0.55 0.37 0.37 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Volatility was obtained using the standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
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Table 1a DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 4-YEARS 
ESTIMATION Method: Panel EGLS (Cross section fixed/random effects) 
 
Sample  EU27 (RE) EU15 (FE) NMS12 (RE) 
Specifications (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 
 
-5.62 
(-1.4) 
-5.13 
(-1.27) 
9.42 
(1.19) 
10.07 
(1.26) 
0.86 
(0.27) 
1.49 
(0.46) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.08*** 
(-4.12) 
 -0.07*** 
(-4.03) 
-0.15 
(-0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.106*** 
(-5.39) 
-0.103*** 
(-5.22) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.67** 
(2.07) 
0.61** 
(1.88) 
-0.36 
(-0.59) 
-0.52 
(-0.85) 
0.13 
(0.43) 
0.13 
(0.40) 
 I 
 
-0.07*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.29*** 
(-5.63) 
-0.28*** 
(-5.42) 
-0.018 
(-1.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
 IP 
 
-0.03*** 
(-2.57) 
-0.03** 
(-2.57) 
-0.252*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.5) 
-0.02* 
(-1.85) 
-0.02** 
(-1.27) 
Ur 
 
 0.12*** 
(3.61) 
 0.12*** 
(3.78) 
0.11** 
(2.15) 
0.13** 
(2.54) 
0.037 
(1.41) 
0.038 
(1.43) 
P 
 
0.17** 
(1.93) 
0.18** 
(2.15) 
0.28*** 
(2.97) 
0.32*** 
(3.42) 
-0.01 
(-1.05) 
-0.011 
(-1.06) 
R 
 
 
0.008 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
0.0007 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(-0.10) 
0.019 
(0.77) 
0.022 
(0.89) 
VR4 0.33*** 
(3.15) 
 0.36** 
(2.07) 
 0.34*** 
(3.29) 
 
  
VR3 
 
 0.27*** 
(2.67) 
 0.21 
(1.23) 
 0.31*** 
(3.16) 
 Pol 
 
 -0.209 
(-1.35) 
 -0.24 
(-1.56) 
-0.58** 
(-2.15) 
-0.57** 
(-2.10) 
-0.09 
(-0.74) 
-0.14 
(-1.12) 
Observations 373 373 210 210 162 162 
Hausman Test 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.008 0.52 0.58 
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.65 0.65 0.37 0.37 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Volatility was obtained using the standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
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Table 2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 4-YEARS 
Independent variable Dummy variable - EU15 
 (1) (Revenues) (2) (Exp) (3) R and E 
Constant 
 
-1.57 
(-0.62) 
3.30 
(2.14) 
1.57 
(0.97) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.09*** 
(-5.13) 
 -0.06*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.69) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.64*** 
(3.06) 
-0.24* 
(-1.81) 
-0.075 
(-0.55) 
 I 
 
-0.06*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.01** 
(-1.93) 
-0.015*** 
(-1.52) 
 IP 
 
-0.018 
(-1.38) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.05) 
Ur 
 
 0.09*** 
(4.96) 
 0.016 
(1.26) 
0.007 
(0.56) 
P 
 
-0.01*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.08) 
-0.003** 
(-2.11) 
R 
 
-0.03*** 
(-3.11) 
 
 
-0.052*** 
(-4.29) 
VR4 0.38*** 
(3.65) 
 -0.29*** 
(-3.90) 
DVR4 0.17 
(1.17) 
 -0.018 
(-0.16) 
E  -0.006 
(-0.86) 
0.04*** 
(3.32) 
VE4  0.59*** 
(13.56) 
0.48*** 
(9.10) 
DVE4  0.27*** 
(5.57) 
0.31*** 
(5.36) 
Pol 
 
 -0.108 
(-1.007) 
 0.05 
(0.811) 
0.03 
(0.5) 
Observations 372 372 372 
R-squared 0.35 0.73 0.75 
Wald test VE4=VR4   t-statistic: -1.66 * 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
DVR4 – dummy variable that assumes 1 for EU15 countries for revenue volatility 
DVE4 - dummy variable that assumes 1 for EU15 countries for expenditure volatility 
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Table 3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 3-YEARS 
 
  
Independent variable EU27 EU15 NMS12 
Constant 
 
-3.42** 
(-1.88) 
-2.77 
(-0.57) 
-2.54 
(-1.05) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.11*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.092*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.119*** 
(-5.95) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.74*** 
(4.13) 
0.57* 
(1.79) 
0.33 
(1.24) 
 I 
 
-0.03*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.128*** 
(-4.097) 
0.009 
(0.57) 
 IP 
 
-0.001 
(-1.64) 
0.038 
(0.50) 
0.002*** 
(2.67) 
Ur 
 
 0.085*** 
(4.64) 
0.130*** 
(4.22) 
0.03** 
(1.89) 
P 
 
-0.011*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.01 
(-1.44) 
R 
 
 
-0.027*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.02 
(-1.64) 
0.013 
(0.66) 
  
VR3 
 
 0.43*** 
(4.50) 
0.44** 
(2.07) 
0.38*** 
(3.77) 
 Pol 
 
 -0.060 
(-0.601) 
0.13 
(0.55) 
-0.02 
(-0.24) 
Observations 397 224 172 
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.36 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
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Table 4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 4-YEARS 
 
Independent variable EU27 EU15 NMS12 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 
 
-0.63 
(-0.45) 
-6.52 
(-1.52) 
2.47 
(1.008) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.04*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.05 
(-1.61) 
-0.052*** 
(-2.68) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.09 
(0.74) 
0.72*** 
(2.63) 
-0.07 
(-0.31) 
 I 
 
-0.02*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.04* 
(-1.52) 
-0.03** 
(-2.23) 
 IP 
 
-0.022** 
(-2.52) 
-0.29*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.02** 
(-2.46) 
Ur 
 
 0.014 
(0.104) 
0.11*** 
(4.72) 
-0.009 
(-0.46) 
P 
 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.006 
(-0.98) 
E 
 
0.003 
(0.44) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
0.03* 
(1.81) 
VE4 0.76*** 
(22.49) 
0.57*** 
(9.13) 
0.47*** 
(7.57) 
 Pol 
 
 0.075 
(1.068) 
0.25 
(1.46) 
-0.095 
(-0.88) 
Observations 372 195 162 
R-squared 0.715 0.70 0.52 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using the standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
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Table 5 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 3-YEARS 
 
  
Independent variable EU27 EU15 NMS12 
Constant 
 
-1.68 
(-1.48) 
0.26 
(0.11) 
-1.14 
(-0.59) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.05*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.041** 
(-2.42) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.97) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.199** 
(1.90) 
-0.015 
(-0.105) 
0.23 
(1.09) 
 I 
 
-0.01 
(1.45) 
-0.015 
(-1.02) 
-0.01 
(-0.99) 
 IP 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.40) 
-0.04 
(-1.24) 
0.0008 
(0.95) 
Ur 
 
 0.008 
(0.69) 
0.06*** 
(4.66) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
P 
 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.002 
(-1.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.70) 
E 
 
 
0.002 
(0.344) 
-0.015** 
(-1.94) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
  
VE3 
 
 0.78*** 
(25.10) 
0.91*** 
(29.37) 
0.56*** 
(10.02) 
 Pol 
 
 0.033 
(0.51) 
0.09 
(0.92) 
-0.09 
(-1.001) 
Observations 397 224 172 
R-squared 0.72 0.86 0.57 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using the standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
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Table 6 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 4-YEARS 
 
Independent 
variable 
EU27 EU15 NMS12 EU27, with dummy variables 
Budget deficit <-3% of GDP 
Public debt >60% of GDP 
Constant 
 
-2.35 
(-1.18) 
-9.62*** 
(-2.63) 
3.05 
(1.07) 
-0.818 
(-0.41) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.02 
(-1.28) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.10*** 
(-4.66) 
 -0.02 
(-1.11) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.68*** 
(3.98) 
0.94*** 
(3.59) 
-0.05 
(-0.18) 
0.56*** 
(3.33) 
 I 
 
-0.06*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.71) 
0.01 
(0.58) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.61) 
 IP 
 
-0.01 
(-1.009) 
-0.18*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.01 
(-1.45) 
-0.018 
(-1.49) 
Ur 
 
 0.089*** 
(4.88) 
0.14*** 
(5.50) 
0.05** 
(2.40) 
 0.07*** 
(4.26) 
P 
 
-0.013*** 
(-5.16) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.89) 
-0.01** 
(-2.35) 
-0.01*** 
(-4.25) 
Bd 
 
-0.17*** 
(-9.11) 
-0.21*** 
(-8.69) 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
-0.049 
(-1.35) 
DBD    -0.149*** 
(-3.99) 
DB -0.008*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.01*** 
(4.76) 
0.01*** 
(3.02) 
-0.008 
(-3.09) 
DDB    0.0008 
(0.36) 
 Pol 
 
 -0.17 
(-1.71) 
0.33 
(1.85) 
-0.17 
(-1.39) 
 -0.21 
(-2.19) 
Observations 372 210 162 372 
R-squared 0.42 0.61 0.36 0.45 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
DBD is a dummy variable with value 1, if the Budget deficit <-3% of GDP 
DDB is a dummy variable with value 1, if the Public debt >60% of GDP 
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Table 7 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: BUDGET BALANCE VOLATILITY 3-YEARS 
 
  
Independent variable EU27 EU15 NMS12 
Constant 
 
-3.01* 
(-1.77) 
-7.15 
(-1.55) 
0.47 
(0.19) 
dGDP 
 
 -0.056*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.07** 
(-1.94) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.10) 
 Log(GDPc) 
 
0.63*** 
(4.07) 
0.68** 
(2.05) 
0.08 
(0.30) 
 I 
 
-0.04*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.108*** 
(-3.37) 
0.036* 
(1.70) 
 IP 
 
0.003*** 
(3.53) 
0.09 
(1.24) 
0.002** 
(1.95) 
Ur 
 
 0.069*** 
(3.88) 
0.14*** 
(4.62) 
0.046** 
(2.13) 
P 
 
-0.012*** 
(-4.64) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.01** 
(-1.92) 
Bd 
 
-0.16*** 
(-8.09) 
-0.04 
(-1.50) 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
DB -0.0006*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.0018 
(-0.64) 
0.013*** 
(2.63) 
 Pol 
 
 -0.132 
(-1.36) 
0.30 
(1.33) 
-0.12 
(-0.99) 
Observations 396 222 172 
R-squared 0.36 0.31 0.33 
Notes: The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
The data sample includes yearly observations for the EU27 countries over the period 1995 to 2011. 
Budget volatility was obtained using standard deviation for 4 and 3 years (rolling windows) 
 
 
